Sustainable Plans by V. V. Chari & Patrick J Kehoe
Sustainable Plans
Author(s): V. V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe
Source: The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Aug., 1990), pp. 783-802
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2937768
Accessed: 07/12/2010 14:02
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Political Economy.
http://www.jstor.orgSustainable  Plans 
V. V. Chari  and Patrick  J. Kehoe 
Federal Reserve  Bank of Minneapolis and University  of Minnesota 
We propose a definition  of time-consistent  policy  for infinite-horizon 
economies with competitive private agents. Allocations  and policies 
are defined as functions of the history  of past policies.  A sustainable 
equilibrium  is a sequence of history-contingent  policies and alloca- 
tions that satisfy  certain sequential  optimality  conditions  for the gov- 
ernment and for private agents. We provide a complete characteri- 
zation of  the  sustainable equilibrium outcomes for  a variant of 
Fischer's  model of capital  taxation.  We also relate our work  to recent 
developments in the theory of repeated games. 
I.  Introduction 
This paper describes a framework  for analyzing the optimal design of 
government  policy in dynamic  general  equilibrium  models  with com- 
petitive  private  agents  and  with  governments  lacking  commitment 
technologies.  In environments  in which societies have a commitment 
technology  to bind  the actions of future  governments,  the policy de- 
sign  problem  is well understood.  The  government  chooses  a policy, 
namely  a sequence  of  event-contingent  functions,  once  and  for  all, 
and  then  consumers  make  their  decisions  sequentially  in a competi- 
tive fashion.  In an environment  with commitment,  the optimal policy, 
together  with the resulting  competitive  equilibrium,  is called a "Ram- 
sey equilibrium." 
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In  environments  in  which  societies  have  no  such  ability to  bind 
future  policy  choices,  the  policy  design  problem  is less well  under- 
stood.  Kydland and Prescott (1977) argued that in such environments 
the sensible way to set up the policy design  problem  was to formulate 
the decision  problems  of both the government  and the private agents 
sequentially,  requiring  that choices  be optimal  at each point  in time. 
For a finite-horizon  model,  they showed  how to compute  the optimal 
policy using  backward induction.  For infinite-horizon  models,  taking 
the limit of the backward induction  solution recovers only one of what 
may be a much larger set of policies and allocations that are consistent 
with sequential  optimality  of  the  government  and  private agents.  In 
particular,  taking  the limit of  the backward induction  solution  rules 
out  the  possibility of trigger-type  equilibria. 
This  paper  studies  several  issues  related  to  the  analysis of  policy 
design  in infinite-horizon  models.  We first show how to formulate  a 
simple general  equilibrium model in which private agents are compet- 
itive, in which the government  maximizes  the welfare of these agents, 
and which exhibits trigger-type  equilibria. We develop  an equilibrium 
concept  in which  both  the  government  and  private agents'  decision 
problems  are sequential.  We call this type of  equilibrium  a "sustain- 
able equilibrium"  to distinguish  it from  others  in the literature  (see, 
e.g., Lucas and Stokey  1983; Atkeson  1988). We illustrate this equilib- 
rium  in an infinite-horizon  version  of  Fischer's (1980)  optimal  taxa- 
tion model.  We show that an arbitrary policy and allocation sequence 
is sustainable if and only if two conditions  are met. First, the sequence 
must  be  a date  0 competitive  equilibrium.  Second,  it must  satisfy a 
simple  set of inequalities.  We use these  inequalities  to show that with 
sufficiently  little discounting,  even the Ramsey allocations are sustain- 
able. We then relate our equilibrium  concept  to that of perfect Bayes- 
ian equilibrium  in an appropriately  defined  game. 
The  novel  feature  of  our  approach  is  that  it blends  features  of 
classical competitive  analysis and game theory.  In our model  the gov- 
ernment  is  strategic  in  that  it  takes  into  account  that  its choice  of 
policy  will  affect  the  choices  of  private  agents.  Thus  in  making  its 
decisions  the  government  must  forecast  how  its  policy  choice  will 
affect  the future  behavior  of private agents.  To  pose this forecasting 
problem,  we define  policies and allocations as functions  of the history 
of  decisions  of  the  government.  This  is a break  from  the  classical 
competitive  approach,  which defines  equilibria as functions  of exoge- 
nous  events.  However,  the  model,  as we set it up,  is not a standard 
game either because the histories do not include the past actions of all 
agents; in particular, they do not include those of consumers.  It is also 
not a standard  game  because  utilities are not defined  for all possible 
choices of the private agents  or the government.  For example,  we do SUSTAINABLE  PLANS  785 
not define  utilities for situations in which either the consumers  or the 
government  violates the budget  constraints  or in which identical  pri- 
vate agents take different  actions. It is possible to set this model  up as 
a game.  Indeed,  we show  how  to map the environment  into  a game 
and  demonstrate  that  the  symmetric  perfect  Bayesian  outcomes  of 
that game coincide  with the sustainable outcomes  of our model.  Thus 
our  notion  of  equilibrium  captures  the  notion  of  perfection  games. 
An  inspection  of  the  cumbersome  notation  of  the  game,  however, 
makes it clear that our  approach  is much  simpler. 
Before  turning  to the  model,  we briefly summarize  how our work 
relates  to  the  three  distinct  literatures  on  which  it builds:  First, we 
extend  the  analysis of  policy  design  in dynamic  general  equilibrium 
models  without  commitment  technologies  (see Kydland and Prescott 
1977,  1980;  Calvo  1978;  Fischer  1980;  Lucas and  Stokey  1983).  In 
this  literature,  the  decisions  of  private  agents  and  the  government 
depend  on  a  small  number  of  state  variables;  in  our  formulation, 
these  decisions  can  depend  on  a much  larger  set of  state variables, 
namely,  the complete  history of past policy. This  difference  explains 
why in our  formulation  the  set of  equilibria without  commitment  is 
much  larger  than  others,  possibly  including  the  Ramsey  allocations 
and  policies. 
Second,  we  build  on  ideas  developed  in  the  theory  of  repeated 
games,  particularly  in  the  oligopoly  literature  (see  Friedman  1971; 
Fudenberg  and  Maskin  1986;  Abreu  1988).  From  game  theory,  we 
borrow the idea of  history-contingent  decisions  and,  from  the litera- 
ture on repeated  games,  Abreu's (1986,  1988) technique  of using the 
worst  equilibrium  to  characterize  the  entire  set  of  equilibrium  out- 
comes.  In that literature,  however,  the games consist of a finite num- 
ber of players, each of whom has strategic power. In ours, there is one 
large agent,  the government,  and a continuum  of competitive  private 
agents.  For this reason,  standard  results from the theory of repeated 
games,  such as the  folk theorem,  cannot  be applied. 
Third,  we  build  on  the  recent  literature  on  time  consistency  in 
macroeconomic  models  (see  Barro  and  Gordon  1983;  Backus  and 
Driffill  1985; Rogoff  1987). In this literature it often  appears as if the 
government  plays a game  against  a coalition  of  noncompetitive  pri- 
vate  agents,  who  may  have  objectives  different  from  those  of  the 
government.  In our model  the government  maximizes  the welfare of 
private agents,  who behave  competitively. 
II.  An  Infinite-Horizon  Economy 
Consider  a simple  infinite-horizon  version  of  a model  similar to the 
one in Fischer (1980).  The  economy  contains a large number  of iden- 786  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
tical consumers  and a government.  There  is a linear production  tech- 
nology,  for which the marginal  product  of capital is a constant R >  1 
and  for  which  the  marginal  product  of  labor is one.  In each  period 
t, t =  0, 1, . . . , consumers  make decisions at two distinct points. At the 
first stage of t, consumers  are endowed  with w units of the consump- 
tion  good  out  of  which  they  consume  cit  and  save kt. At the  second 
stage, they consume  C2t  and work It  units. Second-stage  income,  net of 
taxes, is (1  -  6t)Rkt +  (1  -  Tt)lt, where  at  and Tt denote  the time t tax 
rates on  capital  and  labor.  For simplicity  we  assume  that first-stage 
consumption  and  second-stage  consumption  are perfect  substitutes. 
We  also  assume  that  capital  cannot  be  stored  between  periods.  A 
consumer's  preferences  are given by the discounted  value of the util- 
ity per period,  U(clt,  C2t,  lt), where  the discount  factor  1 satisfies 0 < 
1<  1. 
In  each  period  t the  government  sets  proportional  tax  rates  on 
capital and labor income  to finance  an exogenously  given amount  of 
second-stage  per capita government  spending.  We assume,  through- 
out,  that g >  (R  -  1)w. This  assumption  implies  that in any equilib- 
rium, the government  must tax labor. We also assume  that it is feasi- 
ble to finance  government  spending  with only a tax on labor. 
We consider  two versions  of  this economy,  one  with commitment 
and one  without.  In the commitment  version,  the government  sets a 
sequence  of tax rates once  and for all at the beginning  of time. Con- 
sumers then choose  a sequence  of allocations for all time. In contrast, 
in  the  no-commitment  version,  the  government  and  the  consumers 
make  decisions  sequentially.  We  then  compare  the  optimal  policies 
for these  two versions. 
A.  Commitment 
Consider,  first, the  commitment  economy  in which  the  government 
and the consumers  make their decisions  at the beginning  of time. In 
particular,  let  Ir =  (7ro,  r,  .... .)  denote  an infinite  sequence  of  tax rates 
starting at time 0. For each period  t, let xt  =  (Xit,  X2t)  be the allocations 
for  the  first  and  second  stages  of  t, with  xit  =  (cit,  kit)  and  X2t  =  (C2t, 
12t). Let x  =  (xo, xi,  . .  .) denote  the infinite  sequence  of  such alloca- 
tions. For this environment,  a policy for the government  is an infinite 
sequence  of tax rates IT. An allocation rule is a sequence  of functions 
=  (fo, fi,  . . .)  that maps  government  policies  into  sequences  of  al- 
locations. 
A Ramsey  equilibrium  is a policy IT and an allocation rule  that satisfy 
the  following  conditions:  (i)  For every  policy  IT', the  allocation  rule 
f(7r')  maximizes  E't=0  PtU(cit  +  C2t,  lt) subject  to  cit  ?  X  -  kt and  C2t ? 
(1  -  8')Rkt +  (1  -  T')lt; (ii)  the  policy  IT  maximizes  E't=o PtU(clt(a) SUSTAINABLE  PLANS  787 
+  C2t(TV), lt(,r)) subject to g  '  6tRkt(ir)  +  'tlt(Ir) for t  =  0  .  ,. 
We denote  a Ramsey equilibrium  by the pair (,T,  f ). In the Ramsey 
equilibrium,  some  particular  allocation  will be realized,  namely,  x  = 
f(lT).  We call the Ramsey policy together  with this allocation the Ram- 
sey outcome  and denote  it by (rr', xr). 
PROPOSITION  1. The Ramsey  outcome.-The  Ramsey outcome  (,r', xr) 
has first-stage allocations c't  =  0 and k' =  w and a capital tax rate 6' = 
(R -  1)IR. Second-stage  allocations c't and l'and  the labor tax rate Tr' 
solve 
U=  max  U(c2,  1)  (1) 
subject to 
C2 ?  0  +  (1  -T)1, 
Uc 
g  (R -  1)w  +  Tl. 
Proof. Consider  the allocation rule for capital kt(IT). If the tax rate on 
capital at is strictly greater than 6r,  then consumers  save zero; if at  =  rk 
consumers  are indifferent  among  all levels of savings; and if at  <  ark 
consumers  save their entire endowments.  For now, assume that when 
at  =  6r,  the allocation  rule specifies kt(IT) =  w. The  tax on capital acts 
like a lump-sum  tax when it is selected at any level less than or equal to 
r*. Clearly, it is optimal  to raise as much revenue  as possible from this 
tax.  Since g  >  (R  -  1)w, government  spending  is greater  than  the 
maximal  possible  revenue  from  this capital tax, namely  6rRw;  there- 
fore,  it is optimal  to set at  so that (1  -  6t)R =  1. Faced with this tax, 
consumers  save their  entire  endowments.  Given  these  facts, the  op- 
timal tax problem  reduces  to choosing  c2, 1, and  7  to solve (1). 
Now  suppose  that when  at  =  6r,  kt(IT)  equals some  number  (x  with 
0 < (x <  w. With such a rule, the government  can increase its utility by 
setting  at  arbitrarily close to but smaller than 6r and by setting Tt close 
enough  to  Tr  So  that  the  labor  tax can  raise  the  rest of  the  needed 
revenue.  Consumers  now  choose  to  save  their  entire  endowments, 
and the government  is strictly better off.  Thus  such a specification  of 
kt(IT) is inconsistent  with equilibrium.  Q.E.D. 
Notice  that  the  Ramsey  outcome  satisfies consumer  maximization 
and the sequence  of government  budget  constraints.  Hence,  this out- 
come is some specific date 0 competitive  equilibrium.  More generally, 
we say that a pair of sequences  (,T, x) is a date 0 competitive  equilibrium  if 
it satisfies consumer  maximization  and  the  sequence  of  government 
budget  constraints  (but  not  necessarily  government  maximization). 788  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
(In Sec. III we characterize conditions  under which a date 0 competi- 
tive equilibrium  can be supported  by a sustainable  equilibrium.) 
B.  No Commitment 
The  lack of a commitment  technology  is formally modeled  by assum- 
ing that the timing  scheme  is as follows: for each period t, consumers 
make their first-stage decisions,  then the government  sets current tax 
rates, and then consumers  make their second-stage  decisions.  In each 
period  the  consumers  and  the  government  can vary their  decisions 
depending  on  the  history  of  government  policies  up  to the  point  at 
which  the decision  is made. 
At the first stage of period t, faced with the history h  1 =(,  Is =  0, 
...  , t -  1), each consumer  chooses a first-stage allocationflt(ht  1) and 
a contingency  plan  for  setting  future  actions  for  all possible  future 
histories.  After  the first-stage decisions  have been  made,  the govern- 
ment,  faced  with  the  history  ht- 1, sets time  t tax  rates  rt(ht- 1) and 
chooses  a contingency  plan for setting future  tax rates for all possible 
future  histories.  At  the  second  stage  of  t, an  individual's  history  is 
ht =  (ht1,  -,at).  Faced with ht, consumers  choose  a second-stage  alloca- 
tion f2t(ht) and  a contingency  plan  for  setting  future  actions  for  all 
possible  future  histories.  (The  reader  may wonder  why the histories 
do  not  include  consumers'  decisions.  In  an  earlier  version  of  this 
paper, we did define  histories that way, but it turns out that we do not 
need  to:  no  individual  consumer  perceives  that the  government  or 
other consumers  will change  policies if that consumer  changes  his or 
her  decision.  See also Sec. V, where  we show that deviations  by con- 
sumers  can be ignored  in a game.) 
To  define  a sustainable  equilibrium,  we now need  to explain  how 
policy  plans  induce  future  histories  and  how  policy  plans  together 
with allocation  rules induce  future  utilities.  For any policy plan  r = 
(go,  ar,  ...  .),  let ort =  (Ct  rt+  +,  ...  *)  denote  a sequence  of policy rules 
from time t onward. We call curt  the continuation  of u. Letft  denote  the 
corresponding  objects  for  the  allocation  rules.  Given  a history ht- 1, 
the  policy  plan  o induces  future  histories  by ht =  (ht-  1,  rt(ht- 1)), and 
so on. Given a history ht- 1, the policy plan u and the allocation rule 
induce  future  utilities 
Z  Is-tU(c6s(hs_1)  +  C2s(hs),  4(hs)),  (2) 
S  = t 
where  future  histories  are induced  by  r from  ht- 1. 
Consider  the  first  stage  of  period  t. Given  some  history  h2t,  the 
consumer's  problem  is  to  choose  a  sequence  of  allocation  rules  to 
maximize  (2) subject to SUSTAINABLE  PLANS  789 
cis(h_1)  'O  -  ks(hs_1), 
c2s(hs) ?  [1  -  8s(hl1)]Rks(hs1  )  +  [1  -  T(h5_l)]1s(hs), 
where,  for  all s  t, the  future  histories  are induced  by  r. For any 
history h,_ 1, the consumer's  problem at the second stage of t is defined 
in a similar fashion.  Next,  consider  the situation of the government  in 
period  t. Given some  history h,1  and the fact that allocations  evolve 
according  to f,  the  government  chooses  a policy  plan  at that  max- 
imizes  (2) subject to its budget  constraints 
g  '  8s(h -1 )Rks(hs  - 1) +  Ts(hs  _ O)4(h), 
where,  for all s -  t, the  future  histories  are induced  by  r. 
A sustainable equilibrium  is a pair  (cr,  f)  that satisfies the  following 
conditions:  (i) Given a policy plan  r, the continuation  of the allocation 
rule  solves the consumer's  problem at the first stage for every history 
h,  1, and the continuation  of this allocation rule solves the consumer's 
problem  at the second  stage for every history h,; (ii) given  an alloca- 
tion  rule f,  the  continuation  of  the  plan  r solves  the  government's 
problem  for  every  history  h -  1. 
Note  that consumers  take the evolution  of future  histories as unaf- 
fected  by their  actions  and,  in this sense,  behave  competitively.  The 
government  recognizes  the  effect  of  its policies  on  the  histories  and 
thus  on  the  decisions  of  private  agents  and,  in this  sense,  does  not 
behave  competitively. 
III.  Characterization  of  Sustainable  Equilibria 
In this section  we characterize  the allocations and policies  that result 
from sustainable equilibria. Recall that a sustainable equilibrium  (of) 
is a sequence  oS functions  that specify  policies and allocations  for all 
possible  histories.  When  we  start from  the  null  history  at date  0,  a 
sustainable equilibrium  induces  a particular sequence  of policies and 
allocations,  say (,a, x). We call this the outcome  induced  by the sustain- 
able  equilibrium.  The  technique  for  characterizing  the  set  of  such 
outcomes  builds on Abreu's (1988)  seminal work on repeated  games. 
In  our  models,  however,  agents  behave  competitively  rather  than 
strategically; thus we need  to reformulate  Abreu's arguments. 
We first construct  a sustainable  equilibrium  that we call the  static 
equilibrium.  (This  equilibrium  is static in the sense  that the allocation 
rules  and  policy  plans  do  not  depend  on  the  past history.) We then 
prove  that a sequence  of  policies  and  allocations  can be induced  by 
some  sustainable  equilibrium  if and  only  if it can be induced  by re- 
verting to this static equilibrium  after deviations.  We use this result to 
show that an arbitrary sequence  of  policies and allocations is an out- 790  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
come  of a sustainable  equilibrium  if and only if it satisfies two condi- 
tions:  first, the  sequence  is a competitive  equilibrium  at date  0; sec- 
ond,  the sequence  satisfies some  simple  inequalities. 
Consider,  first,  the  static equilibrium  (uS, fS),  which  is defined  as 
follows.  For any history h,  1, the static policy plan sets ur(h,- 1) equal 
to the policy iTS  =  (TS,  8S), where  8S  =  1 and TS is given in the solution to 
the problem 
=  max  U(w  +  (1  -  T)1, 1)  (3) 
T,  I 
subject to  -  U1IU, =  1 -  v  and g  <  T1. 
The  static allocation  rules  is defined  as follows: For the first stage, 
for every history h,  1, this rule specifies that consumers  save nothing 
and consume  all their endowment;  that is, set k(ht-  1) =  0 and cl (h,  1) 
=  w. For  the  second  stage,  given  any  history  ht, this  rule  sets  the 
allocations  equal  to f'(rrt)  defined  by  the  solution  to  the  problem: 
choose  c2 and  I to maximize  U(w  +  c2, 1) subject to c2 '  (1  -  Tt)l. 
It is immediate  that (oSfS)  is a sustainable equilibrium.  In particu- 
lar, given a policy a' that specifies a capital tax rate of one, it is optimal 
for  consumers  never  to  save.  For  the  second  stage  the  consumer's 
problem  reduces  to the static problem  used  to define f'.  Next,  given 
that the consumer's  allocation rule specifies zero savings for all future 
histories  regardless  of  the  past policies  of  the  government,  it is op- 
timal for the government  to tax capital at rate 1, and the optimal labor 
tax problem  reduces  to the static problem  used  to define  T'. It is also 
immediate  that  the  outcomes  generated  by  (.S,  fS)  are  the  unique 
sustainable  outcomes  when  the horizon  is finite. 
By construction,  it follows  that in each period  of the static equilib- 
rium  the  realized  level  of  utility is  Us. From  proposition  1 we know 
that in each period of the Ramsey equilibrium the realized utility is U'. 
We have the  following  lemma. 
LEMMA  1.  The  utility  level  in  the  Ramsey  equilibrium  is  strictly 
greater than the utility level in the static equilibrium;  that is, U' >  Us. 
Proof. A comparison  of  the Ramsey tax problem  (1) with the static 
tax problem  (3) shows that the static tax problem is simply the Ramsey 
problem with a larger level of g, namely, g =  g  +  (R -  1)w. It follows 
that the  value  of  the  Ramsey  problem  is strictly greater  than that of 
the static problem.  Q.E.D. 
In the next  lemma  we show that the static equilibrium  is the worst 
sustainable  equilibrium.  Proving  this  is  the  key  to  our  method  of 
characterizing  the  set  of  sustainable  allocations.  Let  us  denote  the 
value of utility in a sustainable equilibrium  (a, f ) by Vo(or,f). We have 
lemma  2. 
LEMMA  2. The  autarky equilibrium  is the worst sustainable equilib- SUSTAINABLE  PLANS  791 
rium.  That  is,  for  any  sustainable  equilibrium  (r,  f),  VO(r, f)  2 
Vo(o,  fS) 
Proof. For a given sustainable equilibrium  (a, f),  we construct a plan 
ir that satisfies Vo(o-,f) 2  Vo(cr,f)  ?  Vo(ors,fs).  Define  C as follows: For 
any ht1,  let &,(h,  -1) be the optimal  tax policy in the problem 
Ud(kt)  =  max  U(w  -  kt +  c2, 1)  (4) 
8,T,C2,  1 
subject to 
C2  (1  -8)Rk,  +  (1  -  T)1, 
U' 
g  '  6Rk,  +  T1, 
where kt  is given byfit(ht  1). Next  note that for any history ht =  (ht- 1, 
7rt), the functionf2t(ht_  1, at) can be written as some functionf2(kt,  'at) 
that solves  the static problem 
max  U(w -  kt + c2,  1)  (5) 
C2,  I 
subject to c2  ?  (1  -  bt)Rkt +  (1  -  Tt)lt. 
Now by construction  of  r  and sincef2t solves the static problem,  it is 
clear that FT  is feasible for any such allocation rule. Thus  optimality of 
the government  implies  Vo(o-,f)  2  Vo(?Tf). 
We now  show  that  VO(Fr,  f)  2  Vo(os,  fS).  We argue  that the  utility 
realized  under  the plans  C  and f is at least as high as under  the static 
plans  u.S and fs.  Let  ht denote  the  history  induced  by cr. For  any  t such 
that  f1t(h,  -  1)  specifies  zero  savings,  the  time  t utility  coincides  with 
that of  the  static plan.  For any t such  that flt(ht-1)  specifies  positive 
savings,  the  time  t utility exceeds  that of the static plan.  In any such 
period  the  government  will collect a strictly positive amount  of reve- 
nue  using  what is essentially  a lump-sum  tax on capital, so welfare  is 
higher.  Since  this  argument  holds  for  any  period  t, welfare  under 
(a-,  fI) must  be at least as high  as it is under  (us, fS)  where  all reve- 
nue  is raised  through  the distortionary  labor tax. Q.E.D. 
In  the  next  proposition-which  is  the  paper's  main  result-we 
characterize the conditions  under which an arbitrary sequence  of allo- 
cations and policies  is sustainable.  To  prove  the proposition  we use a 
modified  version  of the static plans called the revert-to-static  plans. For 
an arbitrary sequence  of policies (,a, x), the revert-to-static policy plans 
specify continuation  with the candidate  sequences  (,a, x) as long as the 
specified  policies have been chosen  in the past. If there has ever been 
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ijS.  For consumers  the  allocation  rule  specifies,  immediately  after  a 
deviation,  to  follow  the  second-stage  allocation  rules  defined  in  (5) 
and to revert to the static allocation rulesfs  in all subsequent  periods. 
We then  have proposition  2. 
PROPOSITION 2.  Sustainable  outcomes.-An  arbitrary  pair  of  se- 
quences  (,a, x) is the outcome  of a sustainable equilibrium  if and only 
if (i) the pair (,a, x) is a competitive  equilibrium  at date 0 and (ii) for 
every t, the  following  inequality  holds: 
00 
Z  1stU(Cls  +  c2Q,  14)  UUd(kt)  +  VI  (6) 
where  Ud(kt)  is defined  in (4). 
Proof. Suppose,  first,  that  (,a, x)  is  the  outcome  of  a  sustainable 
equilibrium  (of).  Consumer  optimality requires that (,a, x) maximize 
consumer  welfare at date 0. Government  optimality implies that (a, x) 
satisfies the government's  budget  constraint at date 0. Thus  (a, x) is a 
date  0  competitive  equilibrium.  Next,  at  time  t,  given  a  history 
h-  1, a deviation  to the plan ir defined  in lemma  2 is feasible.  Under 
this deviation,  the time t utility is Ud(kt),  as defined  in lemma 2, and for 
any s >  t, lemma  2  guarantees  that  the  time  s utility is at least  UV. 
Clearly, then,  the utility of the government  must be at least as large as 
the right side of (6) for every period  t. Thus  conditions  i and ii hold. 
Next,  suppose  that some  arbitrary pair of sequences  (,a, x) satisfies 
conditions  i and ii. We show that the associated  revert-to-static plans 
constitute  a sustainable  equilibrium.  Consider  histories  under  which 
there have been  no deviations  from  n up until time t. Since (,a, x) is a 
date 0 competitive  equilibrium,  it is obvious that its continuation  from 
time t is optimal  for consumers.  Consider  the situation of the govern- 
ment.  For any deviation  at time t, the discounted  value of utility from 
time t +  1 onward is given by the second  term on the right side of (6). 
Since the policy plan or  was constructed  to maximize  time t utility for 
any kt, the maximal utility attainable under any deviation at t is simply 
the right side of  (6). Hence,  given  that the assumed  inequality holds, 
sticking with the  specified  plan is always optimal. 
Now consider  histories  for which there has been a deviation before 
time  t.  The  revert-to-static  rules  specify  (uS, fS)  from  date  t onward. 
Such rules are clearly optimal for both the consumers  and the govern- 
ment. For histories in which the first deviation is at time t, the second- 
stage  allocation  rules  of  consumers  are  optimal  by  construction. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition  2 completely  characterizes the conditions  under  which 
an  arbitrary  sequence  of  policies  and  allocations  is  sustainable.  In 
particular,  the  proposition  gives  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions 
for a date  0 competitive  equilibrium  to be the outcome  of  a sustain- SUSTAINABLE  PLANS  793 
able equilibrium.  It is worth  noting  that some  competitive  equilibria 
cannot  be the outcome  of  any sustainable  equilibrium.  For instance, 
consider  an equilibrium  with the tax on capital identically equal to one 
and with the tax on labor inefficiently  high  (e.g., let the tax on labor 
be on the far side of the Laffer curve). Clearly, this equilibrium gener- 
ates lower  utility than the static equilibrium  and, thus, is not sustain- 
able. Notice that this equilibrium cannot be sustained for any discount 
factor in the unit interval. 
With  proposition  2,  it can  be  shown  that  if  an  outcome  (,a, x) is 
sustainable for some discount  factor, then it is sustainable for a larger 
discount  factor. A more  interesting  result also follows: namely,  if the 
discount  factor is sufficiently  high, the Ramsey outcome  is sustainable. 
We have  the  following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  3.  Sustainability  of Ramsey allocations.-There  is some 
discount  factor  a  E  (0,  1) such  that,  for  all  E  E  [I,  1), the  Ramsey 
allocations  are sustainable. 
Proof. From proposition  2 it suffices  to show that the inequality  (6) 
holds  for the Ramsey allocations.  Thus  to prove the result, it suffices 
to verify  the inequality 
ur  2  Ud(kr)  +  (  Us 
Rearranging  terms  gives 
l  as (U  _  us)  2  Ud(kr) -  Ur.  (7) 
From  lemma  1, the  left  side  of  (7) is strictly positive.  Thus  there  is 
some  f3 <  1 such that this inequality  holds  for all (  ?  P. Q.E.D. 
Two  remarks about  propositions  2 and 3 are warranted.  First, it is 
immediate  from  the  proof  of  proposition  3 that the  Ramsey alloca- 
tions are not sustainable  for any P E  (0, ().  Second,  in these  proposi- 
tions,  we  develop  conditions  under  which  an  infinite  sequence  of 
specified  outcomes  can  be  sustained  by an  equilibrium.  A  separate 
question  is whether  or not some  specified  discounted  value of utility 
can  arise in an equilibrium.  That  is, given  any number  U satisfying 
Us <  U <  Ur, is there  some  discount  factor such that UI(1 -  P) is the 
date 0 utility level of some sustainable equilibrium? Clearly, by consid- 
ering  an  equilibrium  that  alternates  in  an  appropriate  fashion  be- 
tween  the static and  the  Ramsey allocations and by choosing  the dis- 
count factor to be high enough,  any such utility level can be sustained. 
IV.  An Example 
We present  an example  to illustrate  four  features  of sustainable out- 
comes and their associated  utility levels that follow from propositions 794  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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FIG.  1.-The  set of  stationary sustainable  utility levels 
2 and 3. First, for low enough  values of the discount  factor, the only 
sustainable  outcome  is the  static outcome.  Second,  if  a certain  out- 
come  is sustainable  for some discount  factor, then it is sustainable for 
a larger  discount  factor.  Third,  for  large  enough  values  of  the  dis- 
count  factor,  the  Ramsey  outcome  is sustainable.  Fourth,  for  large 
enough  values  of  the  discount  factor,  all utilities  between  the  static 
and  the Ramsey utilities  are sustainable. 
We  focus  on  stationary  outcomes,  namely,  outcomes  (,n, x)  for 
which  a,  and  xt are  independent  of  t. For  such  outcomes  the  ine- 
qualities in (6) reduce  to the single  inequality 
U(cI  +  C2, 1) 2  (1  -  13)Ud(k) +  13Us.  (8) 
To characterize the set of utilities that satisfy (8), it suffices to consider 
outcomes  in which  8  =  (R  -  1)IR, the tax on labor is set optimally, 
and  k takes  on  all  values  in  [0,  w].  For  any  k, let  U(k) denote  the 
maximized  value of utility under  such an outcome.  For any discount 
factor  I in  [0,  1], let E(@) be  the  set of  stationary  sustainable  utility 
levels; that is, E(@) =  {U(k) I  U(k) 2  (1  -  A)  Ud(k) +  d Us, for some k C 
[0, w]}. Let the utility function  be U(c,  +  c2, 1) =  [(cl  +  c2)'  +  y(l - 
l)']"/  andletox=  -0.3,y=  1.2,1=  100,w=  I0,g=25,andR=2. 
For this example,  the set of stationary sustainable utility levels illus- 
trates  the  four  features  (see  fig.  1). First, for  1 <  0.1,  E(@) =  Us. 
Second,  E(s)  C  E(P')  for  1 <  1'.  Third,  for  1 ?  0.1,  Ur C  E(s). SUSTAINABLE  PLANS  795 
Fourth, for 1  B-  0.48, E(B) =  [Us, UT]. Finally, a rather special feature 
of the example  is that for some values of  3-namely,  13  8  [0.1, 0.48]- 
the Ramsey utility is sustainable,  but some  utilities between  the Ram- 
sey utility and the static utility are not sustainable (at least with station- 
ary outcomes). 
V.  Anonymous  Games 
In this section we provide  one rationalization  of the equilibria consid- 
ered in the previous  sections, but in a game-theoretic  context.  We first 
show  that  the  Ramsey  equilibrium  is  the  unique  subgame  perfect 
equilibrium  of  a game  with commitment.  More  important,  we  then 
show  that  the  set of  sustainable  equilibria  corresponds  to the  set of 
symmetric perfect  Bayesian equilibria of a game with no commitment. 
In the economies  considered  earlier, we modeled  private agents as 
behaving  competitively,  in the sense  that each private agent  assumes 
that his decisions  can affect neither  the government's  policies nor any 
other  private agents' decisions.  We capture  this feature  in a game by 
using  two assumptions.  First, we assume  that there is a continuum  of 
agents.  Second,  we  assume  that  individuals  observe  only  their  own 
decisions  and  aggregate  outcomes.  A  game  with  these  features  is 
called  an anonymous  game  (see Green  1980,  1984). 
A.  General Setup 
There  is  a  continuum  of  private  agents,  represented  by  Lebesgue 
measure  X on the interval  [0, 1], and a player called the government. 
A policy for the government  is a pair of tax rates  an  =  (8, T), with 0 ' 
8,  X  ?  1. An action  profile  for private agents  is a pair of measurable 
functions  x  =  (k, 1): [0,  1] -*  [0, w] X R+.  We denote  the implied  ac- 
tion  of  an individual  agent  i by x(i)  =  (k(i), I(i)). The  single-period 
payoffs  of  agent  i are 
Vi(,a,  X(i),  x) 
=  U(w  -  k(i)  +  (1  -  6)Rk(i)  +  (1  -  T)l(i),  I(i))  +  W(8,  T, K, L), 
where K  =  f k(i)X(di) and L  =  f l(i)X(di), and where  the function  W 
equals  zero  if its arguments  satisfy the constraint g '  8RK +  TL but 
equals some large negative  number,  say -M,  otherwise.  The  govern- 
ment's payoff  is V(-r, x)  =  f Vi(-n,  x(i), x)X(di). Recall that in the usual 
definition  of a game,  there are no budget constraints. The  function  W 
incorporates  the budget  constraint  of the government  into its prefer- 
ences  in  such  a  way  that  the  government  will  seek  to  balance  its 
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B.  Commitment  Game 
In a commitment  game,  the  government  first chooses  an infinite  se- 
quence  of policies  ar  =  (ar,)'.  A strategy  for the government  is thus just 
an infinite  sequence  of  policies.  Private agents,  having  seen  'a, then 
make their decisions.  A strategy  profile for private agents is a sequence 
of  functions  f  =  (f,)o  that  maps  policies  ar  into  action  profiles  x. A 
strategy profile  naturally induces strategies for each agent, and these 
strategies  take the form ft(i,  a) for every period.  Payoffs over strate- 
gies are defined  as the discounted  utility of the outcomes  they induce. 
A subgame  perfect  equilibrium  for the commitment  game is a strategy 
,T for the government  and a strategy profile f for private agents  that 
together  satisfy the  following  conditions:  (i)  For each  agent  i, given 
the strategies of other agents as specified byf  and any policy A' for the 
government,  the  strategy f(i,  AT')  maximizes  the  agent's  payoff;  (ii) 
given  the  strategy  profile f,  the  strategy  n maximizes  the  govern- 
ment's  payoff.  Comparing  this  definition  with  the  Ramsey  equilib- 
rium of  Section  II gives the following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  4.  Equilibrium outcomes  of the commitment  game.-The 
subgame  perfect  equilibrium  policies  and allocations  (r,  f(ir))  of  the 
commitment  game  are  identical  to  the  Ramsey  policies  and  alloca- 
tions. 
The  proof of proposition  4 is given in Chari and Kehoe (1989). The 
requirement  of subgame  perfection  is crucial in this proposition.  In- 
deed,  it is easy to see  that the  set of  Nash  equilibria  is considerably 
larger than the  set of  subgame  perfect  equilibria.  Recall that a Nash 
equilibrium is defined  as above, except we require the strategy profile, 
sayf*,  to be an equilibrium  for private agents only at the equilibrium 
policy of the government,  say ar*.  Thus  for policies other than  ar*,  the 
strategy profile*  is unrestricted.  It follows that any competitive  equi- 
librium (ir, x) is the outcome  of a Nash equilibrium. To see this, let the 
strategy profile f*  specify x if the policy  TF is chosen  and specify zero 
savings  and  zero  labor supply  if any other  policy is chosen.  By con- 
struction of W, the government's  payoff  is some large negative  num- 
ber for any policy other  than  a.  Hence,  it is optimal  for the govern- 
ment to choose  a. Then  since (a, x) is a competitive  equilibrium, x is a 
best response  to  A. Thus  (I,  f*)  is a Nash equilibrium  with outcome 
(',  x). 
C.  No-Commitment  Game 
Next,  consider  a  game  without  a commitment  technology.  Let  the 
timing  of  the  moves  be  the  same  as in the  no-commitment  infinite- 
horizon  economy.  In  defining  this game,  we  must  be careful  about SUSTAINABLE  PLANS  797 
what the  players have observed  when  they make their decisions.  We 
formalize  this  by  defining  histories  both  of  the  game  and  for  the 
players. The  history of  the  game  is a complete  description  of all the 
actions chosen  in the past by all players. In particular, at the first stage 
of  period  t, the history  of  the  game  is hit  =  (x5, aIs  <  t) and at the 
second stage it is h2t =  (hit, xit,  at).  In contrast, the history for a player 
i consists  only  of  observed  outcomes.  Each individual  observes  only 
aggregate  outcomes  and,  of  course,  that individual's  own  past deci- 
sions. Thus  a player i's history at the first stage of period  t is h1t(i) = 
(x5(i),  Xs, aIs  <  t), where X,  =  f xj(i)X(di). The  history for player i at 
the  second  stage  is similarly defined.  The  other  player,  the  govern- 
ment,  observes  only  aggregate  outcomes  and past policies.  A history 
for  the  government  at  time  t is Ht  =  ((Xs, -nsIs <  t), Xjt).  Players' 
histories  correspond  to information  sets in the obvious  way. 
Consider,  next, the strategies for the players in the game. A strategy 
for the government  is a sequence  of functions  u =  (ut)'t=  O, which, for 
each t, maps government  histories H, into policies  a.  A strategy  profile 
for private agents is a sequence  of functions  =  (fitf2t)t`=  , which, for 
each stage, maps histories of the game into action profiles. A strategy 
profile naturally induces  strategies of the formf1j(i,  hit) andf2t(i,  h2t) 
for each  agent.  To  be consistent  with our informational  restrictions, 
we  require  that,  for  each  player  i, the  strategies fit(i,  -) and f2t(i,  -) 
depend  only  on  individual  histories.  (Technically,  we  require  that 
ft(i,  .) be measurable  with  respect  to the  a-algebra  generated  by the 
individual  histories.)  Such  profiles  will  be  called  anonymous  strategy 
profiles. 
Payoffs  for  the  players  are  naturally  defined  from  the  outcomes 
that the strategies induce.  For example,  the payoff for player i at time 
t, given  a history of  the game  hit, is 
Wjt(uf(i),f;  hit)  =  E  r-tVl(S  xt(i),  xi), 
S =  t 
where  the future  actions are induced  from hit byf  and u. The  payoff 
for the government  at time t is similarly defined. 
Now  we want  to define  some  type  of  perfect  equilibrium  for  this 
game.  One  approach  would  be to consider  subgame  perfect  equilib- 
rium. Given the informational  restrictions, however,  the only proper 
subgame  is the  original  game  itself;  hence,  any  Nash  equilibrium  is 
subgame  perfect.  (It should  be clear  that a large  number  of  rather 
bizarre  subgame  perfect  Nash  equilibrium  outcomes  exist  for  this 
game. Thus  it is incorrect to say that dynamic consistency is equivalent 
to subgame  perfection.)  An alternative is to consider  a type of Bayes- 
ian equilibrium  (see,  e.g.,  Fudenberg  and Tirole  1988). 798  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
A Bayesian  equilibrium  consists of strategy profiles together  with a 
sequence  of probability distributions.  For every information  set there 
is a probability distribution  over histories of the game consistent  with 
that information  set. Let pt(hjthjlt(i)) denote  a probability distribution 
over the histories of the game h1I  that are consistent with the informa- 
tion set associated  with player i's first-stage history hl,(i).  Likewise, let 
pi(htlHt) and  pi(h2tl  h2t(i)) denote  probability distributions  over a gov- 
ernment  information  set and over a player i's second-stage  informa- 
tion set. Let [i  denote  the collection  of these probability distributions. 
Given  some  collection  of  probability distributions  [u and  strategies  u 
andf,  the expected  utility of player i at the information  set associated 
with history h1t(i) is f  Wjt(uf(i),f;  hit)d4(hjtjhjt(i)).  We can similarly 
define  the expected  utility for the government  at the information  set 
associated  with a history Ht and the payoffs  for players at the second 
stage associated  with a history h2t(i). 
In  the  equilibria  of  Sections  II  and  III,  we used  a representative 
agent  to model  the  private agents.  To  keep  the analysis of the game 
model  parallel with a representative  agent model,  the equilibria must 
be symmetric.  In  the  commitment  game  it is easy to see  that all the 
equilibria  are  (almost everywhere)  symmetric,  so we did not need  to 
impose  symmetry.  But  in  the  no-commitment  game,  there  typically 
are asymmetric equilibria; hence,  for that game we require symmetry. 
A symmetric  perfect  Bayesian equilibrium  is an anonymous  strategy pro- 
filef,  a government  strategy u, and a collection of probability distribu- 
tions  [i  such that (i) for each player i, period  t, and history hjt(i), for j 
=  1,  2,  the  continuation  of  the  strategy f (i)  maximizes  player  i's 
expected  payoff;  (ii) for each period t and history Ht, the continuation 
of u maximizes  the government's  expected  payoff;  (iii) the strategies 
of  consumers  are  symmetric;  and  (iv)  pt assigns  probability  one  to 
symmetric  histories. 
To understand  condition  iv, consider,  for example,  the information 
set of player i corresponding  to the history hIt(i) =  (x5(i), Xs, -,Is  <  t). 
Condition  iv requires that p{( I  ht(i))  assign probability one to the sym- 
metric history of the game associated with hIt(i), namely, to the history 
h't  =  (xs, 7rrls  <  t) that for each s <  t satisfies  a'  =  as, xs(j)  =  Xs for 
each j #  i, and  xs(i)  =  xs(i). In other  words,  this condition  requires 
that, at any information  set, player i believe  that all the other  private 
agents  have behaved  symmetrically  in the  past. Similarly, it requires 
that the government  believe  that all private agents have behaved  sym- 
metrically in the  past. 
PROPOSITION  5. Equilibrium  outcomes  of the no-commitment  game.-The 
set of  symmetric  perfect  Bayesian  equilibrium  outcomes  of  the  no- 
commitment  game  is the  same  as the  set of  sustainable  equilibrium 
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Here  we  provide  an  intuitive  explanation  of  the  proposition.  A 
formal  proof  is presented  in Chari and  Kehoe  (1989).  The  essential 
difference  between  the definitions  of a sustainable equilibrium  and a 
symmetric  perfect  Bayesian equilibrium  is that the latter requires op- 
timality after histories with private deviations, whereas the sustainable 
equilibrium  does not even consider  such histories. To prove the prop- 
osition,  we need  to extend  the functions  that constitute  a sustainable 
equilibrium  to  include  a larger  set of  histories.  For histories  of  the 
game  in which  no  positive  measure  of  agents  have deviated,  extend 
these  functions  for  the  government  and  the  nondeviating  private 
agents  to be  the  same  as if  no  private  agents  had  deviated.  Let the 
deviating  private  agents  act optimally  given  their  histories.  For his- 
tories  in  which  a  positive  measure  has  deviated,  it  really  does  not 
matter  how  we  extend  these  functions  as long  as the  continuation 
strategies  by themselves  form  a Bayesian  equilibrium.  In  particular, 
we can let them  equal  the analogues  of  the static sustainable equilib- 
rium. Intuitively,  the reason this extension  works is that in our anony- 
mous game the deviations  of any single private agent do not influence 
the future  behavior  of  other  agents. 
Symmetry  and  anonymity  both  play crucial  roles  in  the  proof  of 
proposition  5.  First, the  set  of  perfect  Bayesian  equilibria  is larger 
than  the  set  of  symmetric  perfect  Bayesian  equilibria.  For  exam- 
ple,  since  consumers  are  indifferent  among  all saving  levels  when 
(1 -  8)R =  1, we can have asymmetric equilibria in which some consum- 
ers  save  all their  endowments  and  others  save  none.  Furthermore, 
the assumption that the probability distributions assign probability one 
to  symmetric  histories  is  important.  Without  it,  the  government's 
strategies off  the equilibrium  path are affected,  and consequently  the 
set of  equilibria  can be larger. 
The  role  of  anonymity  is somewhat  more  subtle. Suppose,  for ex- 
ample,  that  private  agents  can observe  each  other's  actions.  We can 
show that for sufficiently  little discounting,  it is possible to use trigger 
strategies  to support  the equilibrium  allocations obtained  with lump- 
sum taxation.  The  strategies  specify  that in every period,  agents  save 
their entire endowments  and supply the optimal amount of labor with 
lump-sum  taxation  as long  as all agents  have chosen  these  actions in 
the past. If any player deviates,  the strategies  specify that each agent 
chooses  the  worst  sustainable  equilibrium  allocations.  With  suffi- 
ciently little discounting,  the gains from deviating  are outweighed  by 
the future  losses,  so no agent  will deviate.  Notice  that while no single 
private agent  has any effect  on current  aggregate  outcomes,  the fact 
that each  agent's  actions  are observable  means  that a deviation  by a 
single agent can trigger a move to a "bad"  equilibrium. Our restriction 
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outcomes  implies  that a single  agent  can  deviate  without  being  de- 
tected  by any other  player in the  game.  In our game,  these  types of 
trigger  strategies  are inconsistent  with the information  structure. 
Notice  that the type of game set up here is quite different  from the 
standard  repeated  oligopoly  game of  Friedman  (1971),  as well as the 
more  general  class of  repeated  games  analyzed  by  Fudenberg  and 
Maskin (1986)  and Abreu  (1988).  Their  games have a finite number 
of  players  with  standard  information  structures.  In  contrast,  our 
game  has  one  large  player  and  a  continuum  of  small  anonymous 
players.  These  differences  lead  to  different  results.  For  example, 
Fudenberg  and  Maskin show that with sufficiently  little discounting, 
any vector of average  payoffs  that is better than mutual minimax  can 
be supported  by a perfect  equilibrium.  In our model,  this is not true. 
When  U(w, 0)  is  normalized  to  be  zero,  it is clear  that  the  mutual 
minimax  payoffs  are  -M.  (Each player saves nothing  and  does  not 
work, and the government  cannot meet its budget  constraint.)  In our 
model,  regardless  of  the  discount  factor,  no  average  utility  that  is 
lower than the static utility (some positive number) can be supported. 
Technically,  our model  gives rise to payoffs that do not satisfy Fuden- 
berg  and  Maskin's "full-dimensionality"  condition. 
VI.  Conclusion 
We wrote this paper  to address  four related questions:  (1) Is it possi- 
ble  to  build  a  simple  general  equilibrium  model  in  which  private 
agents  are competitive,  in which the government  maximizes  the wel- 
fare of these agents,  and which exhibits trigger-type  equilibria? (2) If 
so, precisely  what is the equilibrium  concept;  in particular, what are 
the decision  problems  of  private agents?  (3) Is it possible  to charac- 
terize  all  the  equilibria?  (4)  How  is  the  notion  of  time  consistency 
related  to standard  notions  of  perfection  in  game  theory? We  ana- 
lyzed  these  questions  in  a variant  of  Fischer's  taxation  model.  We 
developed  an equilibrium  concept  in which  private agents  are com- 
petitive and in which trigger-type  equilibria are possible. We charac- 
terized  the equilibrium  outcomes  by a pair of simple conditions,  and 
we  showed  the  equivalence  between  sustainable  outcomes  and  the 
symmetric  perfect  Bayesian  equilibrium  outcomes  of  an  appropri- 
ately  defined  anonymous  game.  (For a further  discussion  of  these 
issues,  see  Chari, Kehoe,  and  Prescott [1989].) 
In  some  part  of  the  macro  literature/verbal  tradition,  we  have 
heard  expressed  the  (admittedly  fuzzy)  idea  that Ramsey  equilibria 
and time-consistent  equilibria can be thought  of as two different  equi- 
librium  concepts  for  a  single  policy  game.  These  are  supposed  to 
correspond,  respectively,  to imperfect  and perfect  Nash equilibria of SUSTAINABLE  PLANS  8oi 
that game.  An important  message  of this paper is that the distinction 
between  Ramsey  equilibrium  and  time-consistent  equilibrium  is not 
perfection  since both require it; rather, the distinction is that they are 
equilibria of  two very different  games. 
In  terms  of  comparing  our  approach  with  the  standard  game- 
theoretic  one,  it should  be clear that ours  is much  simpler.  Further- 
more,  since  the  sustainable  equilibrium  outcomes  coincide  with  the 
equilibrium  outcomes  of the game,  our approach  does  not miss any- 
thing essential  in the game.  We believe  that the equivalence  between 
the sustainable equilibria and the Bayesian equilibria of an appropri- 
ately defined  anonymous  game  holds  true for a wide variety of mac- 
roeconomic  models.  In particular, we have shown this equivalence  for 
a  model  with  debt  (Chari  and  Kehoe  1989).  Our  characterization 
theorems  should  also apply to a variety of models. 
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